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Introduction.
The U.S. Military is currently operating in an extremely complex environment. 1 While war has always been an imprecise activity that's nature was discussed at length by Clausewitz, its character has arguably become more dynamic. Cyber-warfare, non-state actors, terrorism, criminal activity, and globalization (among other things) blend together with regular and irregular warfare to create new points of friction and uncertainty.
2 This
Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) extends beyond the operational paradigm of counterinsurgency (COIN) in which the military is currently operating. It is the full spectrum of operations containing high intensity, "conventional" conflict, COIN, stability operations and so forth, often simultaneously occurring in a dynamic hybrid. However, the manuals do an inadequate job addressing the temporal character of warfare, how templates for a particular problem can become stale over longer durations, or how the problem is often entirely original. The Army intelligence manuals devote little attention to assessment, proper identification of the character of the conflict, or the threat center of gravity (COG). They also do not place enough emphasis on how a threat organization and the environment interact, adapt, and behave as a complex system. linkage can lead to a disparity in the quality of the intelligence product analysts provide to the operational commander.
General Systems Theory (GST) and associated concepts when properly applied to the intelligence processes offer promising methods to better address the challenges of the COE,
and improve the quality of the intelligence products that support operational design and planning. 8 Systemic thinking when used effectively moves beyond viewing a problem through a purely systematic manner, and examines the interactions between the parts of the system in a changing environment. 9 It is an approach to understanding systems in holistic manner and regularly reassessing the operating environment, in contrast to traditional methods, which are conducted in isolation of potential change over time. Systemic thinking also focuses on identifying the root problems, and building plans to address them, rather than merely attacking a symptom. In essence, systemic thinkers attempt to ensure the military is "doing the right things", which is arguably much more important than just "doing things right". 10 Supplementing the current intelligence doctrine and training with systemic thinking can therefore provide a more balanced approach to IPB/IPOE, improve critical thinking in our intelligence personnel, and provide better situational understanding during the design and planning process. In doing so, they subordinate critical evaluation of the operational environment and the threat, lose their agility, and their ability to rapidly identify and adapt to novel situations.
Intelligence doctrine and associated training must teach intelligence personnel to open their apertures and view their environment more comprehensively, in a way that incorporates not just linear, but also spatial and abstract methods. Systemic thinking is the missing piece in doctrine that allows intelligence personnel to operate effectively in the current and future operating environments, where problem sets are incredibly complex, inter-related, and less predictable as the complexity level increases.
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Systems Thinking.
Systemic thinking and General Systems Theory (GST) is generally attributed to Dr. interactive complexity creates an unpredictable and non-linear system that does not exhibit a predictive cause and effect reaction the way a complicated system does. Tensions could be moral, physical, psychological, or of other natures. These tensions according to SOD, can be exploited and used to create systemic shock within the rival system, and bring about reduction in capabilities, defeat, or at least acceptable change in the rival systems behavior.
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What are of great importance in SOD are the concepts of "emergence" and "learning", and what they imply for reassessing a problem. 43 SOD maintains that each problem model design teams develop is framed within a particular time and space, and decisions made to affect the problem create variable change and ultimately can alter the problem entirely. The problem frame and associated solution is a "one-shot operation". 44 Therefore, it is imperative for the unit conducting operations in a complex environment to constantly learn what about themselves, the rival system, and the environment has changed that may affect their plan.
Additionally, the rival organization may reveal more about its true shape based on operations, actions, and re-actions that reframe the way a unit understands their opponent. 42 Naveh, 7-19. 43 Sorrels et al, [19] [20] [21] [22] TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, 11.
Solutions, objectives, and endstates likewise must be flexible -they are on a scale of better to worse rather than one solidified outcome.
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In recent conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan, military intelligence planners have intuitively begun incorporating aspects of systemic thinking into design and planning. 46 However, intelligence staff participants on design teams and planners need more formalized training and professional development at the unit level in systemic concepts prior to deployment to maximize its used and effectiveness. Furthermore, the concepts like other TTP's deserve to be incorporated into institutional knowledge preserved in the Army's intelligence doctrine, and ensure it is properly nested with Army operations manuals.
Systems Thinking in Intelligence Operations.
Intelligence doctrine has relied on reductionist methodology and focused more on Van Riper, Paul. " Self Organizing Groups and How Combat Applies to Business, 2009;  capabilities. A threat organization may not be a true adversary, but merely a rival or "peer competitor", or a set of conditions that need to be changed. 53 The rival system may have competing ideologies or rationales behind why it behaves the way it does based on societal, tribal, or familial norms. These competing ideologies may be the tension that can be exploited, just as another tension can be caused by a shortage of fuel for instance, that causes a rival system to have to choose between which supported organization it supplies.
Systemic tensions that intelligence personnel identify can lead to opportunities for exploitation in the rival system, identify sources of strength, critical capabilities and the COG. Through reevaluation, systemic thinking will also assist intelligence personnel in identification of potential changes in the COG over time -a factor many analysts and planners likely do not take into consideration. Identification of these critical capabilities, exploitation points (or vulnerabilities) and the COG are essential to effective operational design and planning. Accounting for change and in these factors is a way intelligence personnel can proactively contribute to operations.
The templates presented in FM 34-130, the new FM 2-0, and the new FM 2-01.3 offer good starting points for attempting to understand the character of the conflict a unit is engaged in. However, intelligence analysts must be instructed that systemically speaking, these templates are imperfect interpretations of the system framework they are investigating.
The chosen templates can become less useful over time as the threat evolves. Consequently, intelligence personnel must be prepared to reframe their intelligence model of the operating environment, as they receive and process information about the operational area.
Information may reveal changes the threat or rival organization has adopted, changes in the 53 J.R. Groen, "Systemic Operational Design: Improving Operational Planning for the Netherlands Armed physical or social environment, as well as erroneous assumptions that may have shaped the previous intelligence estimate. Intelligence practitioners must in essence develop an epistemic approach to their intelligence estimate as well as the information, reports, and methods they used to collect the data.
54
When planning ECOA's, doctrine and individual training must instruct analysts to realize the limit to the predictive nature of their threat courses of action in complex environments, and not become wedded to them. 55 Given the complex character of the operating environment, it may also be advisable to look at capabilities or vignettes of possible enemy actions, rather than firm courses of action. 56 Exceptions to this might be if the intelligence practitioner has what they consider reliable information regarding threat activities or intent. 57 Intelligence personnel must understand that once a friendly organization executes a course of action, the action creates a new situation on the ground and likewise effects the threat or rival's intentions, capabilities, and course of action. 58 Like the military planner, intelligence personnel must review and re-assess their understanding of the threat's capabilities and intent. If necessary, the threat model must be altered or outright abandoned.
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Systemic thinking and associated concepts also have value during intelligence operational planning, which builds collection plans for human and technical sensors the U.S.
Army employs during operations. SOD for instance, advises the use of "meta-questions" during design, which can be directly related to the development of Commander's Critical Even with the best computer modeling and information sharing tools available, military professionals will not be able to completely account for all of the inter-related factors of a system, or the variable change that occurs.
72 Isenhower and Mann. The Tactical Over-watch Support Team (TOST), the Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC), and Human Terrain Teams (HTT) are but three of the numerous over-watch centers and organizations available for improving holistic understanding of the current operational environments. 73 Luck, Gary, and Findlay, Mike. "Joint Operations Insights and Best Practices", (2 nd ed., Washington, DC: United States Joint Forces Command: Joint Warfighting Center, July 2008), 9-15. GEN (Ret) Luck and COL (Ret) Findlay make similar arguments about the limits mechanistic techniques in predicting behavior of complex systems -including using some systems of systems and EBO approaches.
Systemic thinking therefore, is part of the methodology we must teach our intelligence personnel to employ throughout the intelligence process and incorporate in our U.S. Army intelligence doctrine. Systemic thinking concepts have tremendous value for members of the intelligence community, who provide the critical linkage between understanding the problem through intelligence preparation of the operating environment, and operational design. 74 Incorporating systemic thinking into U.S. Intelligence doctrine and training is a way bridge the gap between what doctrine instructs intelligence personnel to do, what is actually being employed in current conflicts, and what will likely have applicability in the future. Holistic assessment teaches our intelligence soldiers to look at relationships, tensions, and possible second or third order effects of actions against a system. Systemic thinking teaches our intelligence personnel that no template or assumption is perfect, and those that may be valid for a particular problem model lose relevance over time. Continual reassessment of the problem is thus required. Incorporation of these concepts will help foster an adaptive intelligence staff that not only provides a commander with better initial analysis, but a staff that is better able to synthesize information, rapidly seize and maintain the initiative, and maintain operational agility.
